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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. What is the required foundation for the admission 
of expert testimony relating to the breathalyzer test? 
2. Is the Utah Implied Consent Law (Utah Code Ann. 
1953, §41-6-44.10(a)), constitutional? 
3. Were field sobriety tests affirmative acts governed 
by Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980)? 
4. What constitutes custodial interrogation requiring 
the Miranda warning? 
5. May the results of the breathalyzer test at the 
time of the test be admitted without proper instruction to deter-
mine the amount of alcohol in the blood at the time of the driving? 
6. Was the appellant denied due process of law by the 
lower courts permitting a mandatory rebuttable presumption relative 
to the percentage of alcohol in the blood and being under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a drunk driving case. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The appellant was tried before a jury in the circuit 
court and was convicted for being in violation of a city ordinance 
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intox-
icating liquor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
The appellant was sentenced in the circuit court and 
appealed to the district court. 
The district court affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court and remanded the case for execution of the judgment, with a 
stay to perfect this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW 
At approximately 10:00 o'clock p.m., January 8, 1982, the 
appellant and the arresting officer were both traveling in a westerly 
direction on 900 South between and State and Main Street (T.37 and 
T.38). The arresting officer was one-fourth block behind the 
appellant (T.41 and T.91) and saw the appellant going west on 900 
South (T.99) and into the storage lane for making a left-hand turn 
onto Main Street (T.100). There were no other vehicles in the area 
(T.40), and the two lanes of traffic to the right of the appellant 
were clear of traffic (T.100). 
Prior to that instant, the arresting officer had seen no 
irregular driving pattern by the appellant -- no zigzagging, no 
changing of lanes, no weaving -- not one iota of impaired driving 
ability while the appellant was driving for many blocks west on 
900 South (T.115). 
After the appellant had properly entered the storage lane 
for a left-hand turn to go south on Main Street, while she was 
approximately 35 feet from the crosswalk, she abruptly turned into 
the right-hand lane on 900 South and then turned right onto Main 
Street and proceeded properly in a northerly direction (T.39). 
The arresting officer testified that he had seen others, 
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who were not under the influence of alcohol, make similar turns 
(T.100 and T.101) while in control of their vehicles (T.114). In 
fact, the arresting officer also made an improper right-hand turn 
from the center lane on 900 South onto Main Street (T.40). 
The appellant did not drive erratically after making the 
right-hand turn before the arresting officer turned on his overhead 
red and blue lights because of the improper right-hand turn (T.40 
and T.101). When he turned on his siren, she stopped abruptly in 
the lane she was in (T.ll and T.112) and then drove to the far side 
of the road at 865 South Main Street (T.35, T.38, and T.lll). 
The appellant had control over her vehicle. She did not 
swerve. She did not cause anyone else any problems in the other 
lanes of traffic. She did not hit any parked cars (T.lll). 
The only driving pattern which caused the arresting officer 
to stop the appellant was the improper right-hand turn from the 
storage lane on 900 South onto Main Street and then the abrupt stop 
immediately after the siren was turned on because of the improper 
right-hand turn (T.115), both of which could have been made by one 
not under the influence of alcohol (T.100, T.101, T.114, and T.115). 
The appellant was initially stopped and arrested for and 
charged with the offense of making an improper right-hand turn from 
the storage lane on 900 South onto Main Street in violation of 
Section 195 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
This charge was dismissed at trial (T.10). When the 
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arresting officer approached the appellant's parked vehicle, the 
appellant rolled down her window, and the arresting officer detected 
an odor of alcohol. This was one reason the arresting officer 
believed the appellant to be under the influence of alcohol (T.42 
and T.100). Yet, the arresting officer admitted that persons with 
the odor of and/or the consumption of alcohol can still be in 
control of the vehicle without being under the influence of alcohol 
(T.114). 
The instant the arresting officer detected the odor of 
alcohol, without knowing how much of or what kind of alcohol which 
caused the odor (T.102), he took her into custody (T.122), arrested 
her (T.123), and questioned her about drinking (T.43) and perform-
ing field sobriety tests without giving her the Miranda warning or 
constitutional rights relating to self-incrimination (T.122 and 
T.123) . 
The appellant requested a lawyer, but the arresting officer 
refused her request until she had performed a test (T.122). 
The arresting officer asked the appellant if she had been 
drinking. The appellant said she had had something to drink (T.43). 
Field sobriety tests were performed. The arresting 
officer then told the appellant she was being arrested for Driving 
While Under the Influence of Alcohol (T.51). 
The appellant was handcuffed and taken to the Salt Lake 
County Jail. She again asked for a lawyer, as she had asked for a 
lawyer at the location of arrest at 865 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah (T.65). Her request was denied. She was told of the 
Implied Consent Law and was given a breathalyzer test by officer 
Dana Orgill who had been trained and certified only to administer 
such a test (T.64) by following written instructions. These were 
his only qualifications from training and certification (T.74). 
Officer Orgill knew nothing about the authenticity or accuracy of 
the breathalyzer machine (T.78), which was a Series 900 Breathalyzer, 
using a chemical ampoule, Control Number 803 (T.67), which was 
destroyed and not in evidence (T.76), but could have been kept to 
check the authenticity of the chemical in that particular ampoule 
(T.78). Officer Orgill had no education of chemistry, physiology, 
or blood (T.72 and T.73). His only qualification was to follow 
directions the same as a person would do by assembling a toy (T.74). 
Officer Orgill administered one test only (T.91). He 
testified it was a poor test (T.89) and that a poor test was not 
an accurate test (T.92). He also testified that he had no knowledge 
of the amount of alcohol in the blood of the appellant at the time 
of driving, only what the machine indicated at the time of testing 
(T.79, T.80, and T.81). 
The record is entirely void of any evidence at all of the 
amount of alcohol in the blood of the appellant at the time of 
driving. 
The respondent called two witnesses. One was Officer 
Orgill who transported the appellant from the scene to the Salt Lake 
County Jail and administered the breathalyzer test. The other was 
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the arresting officer, James W. Pryor. 
The trial court then asked the respondent if it had any 
other witnesses. The respondent said, "No, your Honor." (T.134). 
The trial court then stated to the jury: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the parties, the 
City and the defendant have stipulated 
that if a highway patrol trooper by the 
name of Mark Nielsen were called to 
testify, he would testify as follows: 
That he, by assignment, is the mainten-
ance man, if we can use that phrase, 
maintenance man for the breathalyzer 
which is kept in the Salt Lake City 
Jail. And that within 20 days prior 
to the date of this incident, he 
examined that machine and found it 
to be working properly, and within 20 
days after the date of this incident, 
he examined the machine and found it 
to be working properly. 
Now, he has not been called, 
because the parties have stipulated 
that he would testify to that if he 
were here. 
City rests? (T. 134, T.135). 
Immediately after the trial court asked, "City rests," 
the respondent moved to admit Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, all of which 
related to the breathalyzer test. The appellant objected to their 
admissability because of lack of foundation (T.135). 
The appellant at the time of the above objection also 
moved to strike the testimony and moved for a mistrial because the 
appellant was interrogated and in custody without the Miranda 
warning when she was asked and admitted that she had had something 
to drink (T.135). 
The appellant also moved to dismiss because the respondent 
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did not give her the Implied Consent Law or the Miranda warning 
verbatim, as he should have, but only by a verbal summary (T.136). 
And the arresting officer commanded her to perform the field sob-
riety tests without advising her of her constitutional rights relative 
to self-incrimination, all of which was before trial argued in a 
motion to suppress evidence (T.137). 
The appellant also objected to the admissability of the 
evidence relating to the breathalyzer test because of lack of 
foundation in that there was no expert witness as to how the 
breathalyzer machine operates (T.137). 
All we have here is that a maintenance man, 
had he been here to testify, would say 
well, I checked it 20 days before and I 
checked it 20 days after, it was okay, 
as far as I know. Now, there is absolutely 
no foundation as to this person's qualifications 
as being an expert to check that machine. 
Our stipulation goes merely to a main-
tenance man checking it. That!s not founda-
tion to show that it's authentic. Joe Blow 
from Idaho could come down and say I checked 
it, I checked it; that doesn't mean that 
there's any explanation before this jury as to 
how that machine works, nothing as to the 
chemical analysis or anything else. 
You have a blood test, you have to 
have a doctor or whoever withdrew the blood, 
you have to have the chemist explain what 
kind of a test he did. You don't just say 
I'm a chemist and I made the test. There's 
no test here at all to show that that: was 
authentic, none whatsoever, and therefore, 
there's no foundation and I object to the 
admissibility of the breath test results 
for that reason and the field tests for the 
other reasons that I've given, and the state-
ment against interest for the reasons that 
I've given. 
And I incorporate my objections into 
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a motion to dismiss, for insufficient 
evidence (T.137 and T.138). 
In overruling the appellant!s objection relating to the 
admissibility of evidence relating to the breathalyzer test, the 
court stated that the stipulation included that the machine was in 
good working order (T.139). 
That was not the stipulation! The stipulation has been 
quoted above. The stipulation was limited to the proffered testi-
mony of a maintenance man. 
Even the trial court stated: 
Now, you may argue, certainly, the 
qualifications that are not before the 
jury as to what Mark Nielsen knows or 
doesn't know, but nevertheless, the 
stipulation is it was in good working 
order (T.139). 
This statement of the trial court is an erroneous state-
ment of the stipulation. The stipulation, as quoted verbatim above, 
was limited to the proffered testimony of a maintenance man. The 
stipulation most certainly did not include that the breathalyzer 
was in good working order. Nor did it include that the maintenance 
man was a qualified expert technician who followed the requirements 
of the procedures established by the Commission of Public Safety 
pursuant to A18-02-1: Breath Testing Regulations. 
The respondent rested, and the appellant stated: 
If thatfs all the City has, we'll 
rest, too, your Honor. (T.141) 
The trial court then instructed the jury. (T.141-T.148). 
The trial court instructed the jury that there is a 
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presumption of innocence (T.142) and that there is a presumption 
of guilt (T.146). 
The trial court instructed the jury that the respondent 
has the burden of proof to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt (T.142). And the trial court instructed the jury that the 
presumption of guilt (T.146) may be rebutted by the appellant (T. 
146). Yet, the trial court further instructed the jury there is 
no requirement of testimony by the appellant (T.144). 
The trial court instructed the jury relating to the 
presumption of guilt: 
(c) If there was at the time of driving 
0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol 
in the defendant's blood, it shall be 
presumed that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicating liquor. 
(T.146). 
The trial court also instructed the jury that the accuracy 
of the breathalyzer test was a question of fact for the jury alone 
to determine (T.146). 
The trial court also instructed the jury that they were 
the exclusive judges of the facts (T.147). 
Summations were made by both parties, and the appellant 
was found guilty and sentenced. 
The judgment of the circuit court was appealed to the 
district court. 
The district court affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court and remanded with a stay of execution to perfect this appeal 
to this court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant argues that before the result of the 
breathalyzer test can be admitted into evidence, there must be a 
foundation laid to establish its accuracy and trustworthiness by 
qualified expert testimony. That expert must meet the statutory 
and regulatory standards and not be but a "maintenance" man who 
checked the machine before and after the test. 
The appellant argues that the Implied Consent Law is a 
denial of due process and equal protection by permitting the arrest-
ing officer the choice of chemical tests in that he alone may give 
another in the same classification as the appellant the advantage 
of a blood test over a breath test. 
The appellant argues that the results of the field sob-
riety tests should not have been admitted into evidence in violation 
of self-incrimination because they were affirmative acts and 
"evidence" before American Fork v. Cosgrove, which cannot be applied 
retroactively. 
The appellant argues that custodial testimony should not 
have been admitted because she was in custody while being interrogated 
and denied the constitutional protections of the Miranda warning. 
The appellant argues that there was no evidence as to the 
amount of alcohol in the blood at the time of driving. 
The appellant finally argues most strenuously against the 
mandatory rebuttable presumption instruction which shifted the 
burden of proof to the appellant re reasonable doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF THE RESULTS 
OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST FOR LACK OF 
FOUNDATION FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Certain findings are necessary to establish a proper 
foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer evidence. (Murray 
City v. Hall, Utah , 663 P . 2d 1314 (1983) ) . 
To establish a presumption of the validity of the test 
results, there must be an affirmative finding by the trial court 
that the calibration and testing for the accuracy of the breathalyzer 
and the trustworthiness of the ampoules were performed in accordance 
with the standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
(Murray City, supra). 
Those standards are set forth in A18-02-1: Breath Testing 
Regulations. 3 (b) requires callibrations tests to be performed by 
a "technician." The record is void of any evidence by a technician. 
The only evidence relating to a breathalyzer was the stipulation 
that a "maintenance man" found the machine to be working properly. 
The trial court made no such affirmative finding. And the breath-
alyzer he examined was kept in the Salt Lake City Jail (T.134 and 
T.135). The appellant's breath test was administered in the Salt 
Lake County Jail (T.51). 
5 (c)(2) requires the breath test technician to have 
successfully completed the Breath Testing Supervisors course offered 
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by Indiana State University or a manufacturers repair technician 
course for the breath testing instruments in use in the State of 
Utah. The record if void of any such evidence or affirmative 
finding by the trial court. In fact, the trial court stated: 
Now, you may argue, certainly, the 
qualifications that are not before 
the jury as to what Mark Nielsen 
knows or doesn't know.... (T.139). 
Mark Nielsen was the maintenance man whose proffered 
testimony was in the stipulation (T.134 and T.135). And that stip-
ulation included only that his proffered testimony would be that 
he checked the machine before and after (T.IO), that within 20 days 
prior to the date of this incident, he examined that machine and 
found it to be working properly, and within 20 days after the date 
of this incident, he examined the machine and found it to be working 
properly (T.135). 
The stipulation contained nothing more than the stipula-
tion read to the jury (T.134 and T.135). 
It was made clear to the trial court and to the respondent 
that the appellant was challenging the authenticity and validity of 
the test itself: 
THE COURT: 
Now, one further thing to make sure 
we are all on the same track, as I 
recall, this matter was continued 
from its previous setting, it was 
indicated that there would be a 
stipulation as to the testimony of 
Trooper Mark Nielsen if he were 
called and would testify that he 
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checked the machine before and 
after; is that correct? 
MR. HANSEN: 
Yes. Mr. George and I had a 
discussion on the telephone 
Friday. At that time, I thought 
existed a difference of opinion, 
but I told him I wouldn't be 
picking flyspecks out of pepper 
and that he wouldn't have to call 
certain officers. I want it 
clear, though, that if you'll 
recall when he talked about a 
continuance in chambers, that I 
was challenging the authenticity 
of the test itself, not the check-
ing of the machines and mechanical 
manipulation of using, but when 
we discussed that phase of it in 
chambers, I said I couldn't stip-
ulate to the authenticity of the 
results of the test, because I 
was arguing the blood problem. 
THE COURT: 
Right. 
MR. HANSEN: 
So, for clarification, I said that 
they wouldn't have to have somebody 
come down, they could handle it by 
a proffer in saying that he checked 
it a certain day before and whatever. 
THE COURT: 
That's correct. 
MR. HANSEN: 
A cer ta in day af te r , and that the 
other officer can say that he pushed 
the buttons or whatever. That 's 
not as to the va l id i t y . 
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THE COURT: 
Right. And that will be contained 
in the instruction that 1 give, 
that will be a jury question as to 
the validity of the test. 
(T.10 and T.ll). 
MR. HANSEN: 
Thank you. 
At the close of the respondent's case in chief, the 
respondent moved to admit its Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 pertaining to 
the breathalyzer. The appellant objected for lack of foundation 
(T.135), among other reasons, because there was absolutely no 
foundation as to the maintenance man's qualifications as being an 
expert to check the machine and because there was no expert, no 
foundation whatsoever, as to how that machine operates (T.137). 
The stipulation went merely to a maintenance man checking 
it. That is not sufficient foundation to show that it was authentic 
(T.137). There was no test at all to show authenticity, none 
whatsoever. 
Notwithstanding the appellant's objection for lack of 
foundation, the court admitted all respondent's exhibits, all relating 
to the breathalyzer. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not make an affirmative 
finding that the calibration and testing for accuracy of the breath-
alyzer and the ampoules were performed in accordance with the stan-
dards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
All of this amounted to prejudicial error, and the judgment 
of the trial court and the order of the district court should be reversed 
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(Murray City v. Hall, supra; State v. Lee, Utah, P.2d (1983); 
State v, Jones, 316 S.2d 103 (1975); Westermann v. State, Okla., 
525 P.2d 1359 (1974); and Keel v. Alaska, Al., 609 P.2d 553 (1980)). 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF THE RESULTS OF THE BREATH-
ALYZER TEST BASED ON A DENIAL OF DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
§41-6-44.10(a), is unconstitutional, in violation of the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, §§7 and 27 of the Utah 
Constitution because it states that the arresting officer shall 
determine which of three chemical tests -- breath, blood, or urine --
shall be administered for the purpose of determining whether an 
arrested person was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
or a combination thereof while driving or being in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle. 
November 1, 1982, before trial, the appellant filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence of the breathalyzer test. December 
6, 1982, the day of the trial, but prior to the jury being sworn, 
that motion was argued (T.9) and denied by the trial court (T.9). 
Chiseled in marble above the United States Supreme Court 
-- "Equal Justice Under Law,! -- glaringly tells the world that what 
is fair for one is fair for all in any given situation. 
This is also the cornerstone of Article I, §§7 and 27 
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of the Constitution of Utah: 
Sec. 7: No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 27: Frequent recurrence 
to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of 
individual rights.... 
The word "equal" means the same, even, alike, identical, 
neither inferior nor superior, just uniform, matched, level, par, 
commensurate, balanced, no more no less, share and share alike, 
6 of one and 1/2 dozen of the other, all for one and one for all, 
half and half, as good as, fairness, distinction without a differ-
ence. ... (Words and Phrases; Webster's New International Dictionary, 
Unabridged Edition; Rogetfs Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases; 
and cases galore from all jurisdictions.) 
The purpose of due process and equal protection laws is 
to give to all persons similarly situated the guaranteed rights 
to fair and equal treatment. For example, a law will violate due 
process and equal protection when it accords different treatments 
to different persons within various classifications, i.e., different 
chemical tests to determine amount of alcohol in the blood of all 
suspected drunk drivers. 
Furthermore, a law will violate due process and equal 
protection when it places burdens or privileges on different persons 
within the same classification exercising their fundamental rights. 
This is precisely what Utah's Implied Consent Law does. 
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It places unwarranted burdens or privileges on different persons 
within the same classification exercising their fundamental rights. 
One of the most fundamental rights is the right to a fair trial. 
And the right to a fair trial incorporates the right: to be advised 
of and to confront the evidence to be used against a person at 
trial to entitle that person to an intelligent defense in light of 
all relevant and accessible evidence. (Pitchess v. Superior Court, 
Cal., 522 P.2d 305 (1974)). 
In the instant case the appellant was not advised of her 
rights to confront the evidence to be used against her at trial to 
entitle her to an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and 
accessible evidence. 
Yet, others in the same classification have been and are 
so advised. This is a definite denial of due process and equal 
protection of the law. 
James W. Pryor, the arresting officer, admitted that he did 
not give the appellant the Miranda warning (T.122, T.123, and T.126). 
Yet, he has given the Miranda warning on other occasions (T.123). 
That is not equal. The arresting officer also admitted that he did 
not read Utahfs Implied Consent Law to the appellant (T.124). He 
merely explained (T.52, T.52, and T.124), told (T.124), and advised 
(T.123, T.124, and T.125) the appellant of the consequences if she 
refused to submit to the breath test. Even then, he erroneously 
advised her, because he said her driver's license would be suspended 
rather than revoked. He admitted that the only thing he gave her 
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relative to Utah's Implied Consent Law was his summary of it. He 
did not give it to her as stated exactly in the law (T.126). 
Utah's Implied Consent Law is required to be read verbatim 
to the appellant and all others in the same classification. 
(Gassman v. Dorius, Utah, 543 P.2d 197 (1975); Elliott v. Dorius, 
Utah, 557 P.2d 759 (1976)). 
This was not done to the appellant; yet, it has been and 
still is being done to others in the same classification. This is 
not equal. 
Neither did the officers advise at all, in any manner 
whatsoever, that the appellant had the right to have a blood or 
urine test in addition to the breath test, as is afforded others 
in the same classifications as provided in Utah's Implied Consent 
Law (T.119). This is not equal. 
The appellant objected to all of this, the admission of 
all exhibits, moved to suppress, moved to strike, moved to dismiss, 
and moved for mistrial, all of which were overruled or denied 
(T.9, T.135, T.136, T.137, and T.138). 
Utah's Implied Consent Law provides that a peace officer 
shall determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered.... 
The effect of this is to deprive the appellant and others in the 
same classifications due process and equal protection of the law, 
because it places unwarranted burdens or privileges on different 
persons in the same classifications exercising their fundamental 
rights. 
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By authorizing police officers to determine in their sole 
discretion which chemical test to administer, the Utah Legislature 
has in effect allowed the police officers to determine who will have 
an adequate defense. 
For example, persons in the same classification who have 
blood or urine tests administered have unwarranted privileges in 
the exercise of their fundamental rights. Those who have breath 
tests administered have unwarranted burdens in the exercise of their 
fundamental rights. 
Upon completion of a blood or urine test, those samples 
can be preserved and analyzed again. Upon completion of a breath 
test, however, that sample disappears (T.76). It amounts to T,the 
destruction of evidence." (Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 
367; 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780; 84 S.Ct. 881.) It is not preserved, nor 
can it be independently analyzed. The only record of a breath test 
is a formal writing or a printout card indicating the frequently 
questionable results. In fact, the breathalyzer test has been 
replaced by the intoxilyzer test because of the inaccuracy of the 
breathalyzer test. Extraction of blood samples for testing is a 
highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person 
is under the influence of alcohol. (Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 
at 436, n. 3; 1 L.Ed.2d at 451). 
Upon completion of a breath test, an independent forensic 
chemist cannot examine the breath test sample to determine its 
accuracy. The kinds, quality, nor quantities of chemicals and the 
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glass itself of the ampoules are destroyed. 
Several states require at least two breath tests be 
conducted. Utah gives only one (T.91). 
Several courts have found this to be a violation of a 
defendant's right to due process and equal protection of law. 
As relevantly stated in People v. Riser, Cal., 305 P.2d 
1, at 13: 
... the state has no interest in 
denying the accused access to all 
evidence that can throw light on 
issues in the case.... 
The unfettered discretion given peace officers as to which 
chemical test is to be given one person and another chemical test 
which is to be given other persons in the same classification is 
not equal. 
Therefore, Utahfs Implied Consent Law is unconstitutional 
as a denial of due process and equal protection both on its face 
and as it is applied. 
Furthermore, the results of the breathalyzer test (an 
affirmative act) should not have been admitted in evidence in this 
criminal trial because such was a denial of appellant's constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination, in violation of Utah Const., 
Art. I, §§12, as interpreted by Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315 
(1980), the applicable law at the time of trial of this instant 
case (1981) although since overruled by American Fork v. Cosgrove, 
Utah, 701 P.2d 1069(1985). See, also, State v. McCumber, Utah, 622 
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P.2d 353 (1980). 
This principle of law will be more fully discussed in 
Point III as it relates to field sobriety tests. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE FIELD 
SOBRIETY TESTS. 
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that a suspect 
or an accused cannot be compelled to perform roadside or field 
sobriety tests. (Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168 
(1983); Justice Durham, concurring in result, but not as to custody, 
that field sobriety tests violate right against self-incrimination 
under Utah Const., Art. I, §12, as interpreted by Hansen v. Owens, 
Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980)). 
It is true that Hansen, supra, was overruled by American 
Fork v. Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P. 2d 1069 (1985). Nevertheless, Hansen, 
supra, was the applicable law at the time of the alleged offense 
charged in this instant case. And, Cosgrove, supra, cannot be 
applied retroactively to deprive appellant of her then vested con-
stitutional rights. To attempt such would in effect amount to an 
ex post facto law, which is prohibited. (U.S. Const., Art. I, §10; 
Utah Const., Art. I, §18.) 
Consequently this point will be discussed by applying the 
law as it existed at the pertinent time and not as it exists at the 
present time because of Cosgrove, supra. 
In this instant case, the appellant was compelled to 
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perform field sobriety tests in that she had been taken into 
custody, arrested (T.122, and T.123), and commanded (T.48) to 
perform field sobriety tests. She was refused her request for a 
lawyer until she had performed a test (T.122). 
Utah Const., Art. I, §12 provides: 
... an accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Hansen, supra, this court held specifically that this 
language was intended to have a broader meaning (all-inclusive, 
i.e., all evidence: physical, documentary, testimonial) than the 
phrase used in U.S. Const., Amend. V: 
... to be a witness against himself... 
In Hansen, supra, this court held that an accused could 
not be compelled to furnish an example of his handwriting (an affirm-
ative act, non-testimonial evidence). Further, this court declined 
to follow the principle adopted in Shmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 908 (1966). 
In Shmerber, supra, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the state provisions against self-incrimination meant the same 
thing as the federal provision. Thus, protection was limited to 
testimonial evidence; not physical or documentary evidence. 
This court in Hansen, supra, however, reasoned that every 
word in the Constitution of Utah had been carefully chosen and must 
be given its own separate and commonly understood meaning. 
That interpretation of the Utah constitutional provision 
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was further explained, later that same year, in McCumber, supra. 
There this court explained that the prohibition against self-
incrimination applies to affirmative acts that a defendant may be 
compelled to do. 
It may be noted that most states which have provisions 
in their constitutions similar to Utah's have held that their pro-
visions protecting against self-incrimination are identical to the 
provision of the federal constitution. The United States Supreme 
Court, however, has recently upheld the prerogative of the different 
states to interpret their constitutions as they deem proper. South 
Dakota v. Nevill, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
Utah was one of those states which had chosen to give a 
different meaning to a constitutional provision than the federal 
court's interpretation of a similar provision. Thus, the courts of 
Utah were bound to follow that interpretation until it was overruled 
by Cosgrove, supra. 
Thus, it appears that the results of field sobriety tests 
were the type of evidence that fell within Utah's interpretation of 
its own constitutional provision protecting an accused from self-
incrimination. Field tests are affirmative acts. They are designed 
to communicate information to police officers regarding the guilt 
or innocence of one suspected of driving under the influence. The 
tests provide the officers with evidence that can be and is used 
against an accused in a criminal action. 
Appellant firmly contends that the results of field sobrie 
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tests should have been suppressed as evidence because she did not 
knowingly and voluntarily waive her right not to be compelled to 
give evidence against herself. Appellant further submits that she 
did not knowingly or voluntarily waive that right because she was 
not advised of her right. She sought advice by requesting her 
lawyer, but was refused a lawyer until she had performed a test 
(T.122) and was commanded to take the field sobriety tests (T.48). 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the use 
of involuntary or coerced testimonial evidence in a criminal trial 
necessitates reversal, regardless of how much other evidence of 
guilt remains. (Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); and 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 505 (1963)). 
Applying Hansen, supra, all involuntary or coerced 
evidence necessitates reversal. 
Thus, the appellant requests that this court rule the 
admission of the field sobriety test results constituted reversible 
error. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
BY ADMITTING CUSTODIAL TESTIMONY WITHOUT 
GIVING THE MIRANDA WARNING. 
During trial, the arresting officer, James W. Pryor, 
testified that the appellant stated she had been drinking (T.34). 
Appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the 
appellant was being questioned while in custody, but the Miranda 
warning had not been given by the officer (T.122 and T.123). 
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Pursuant to the Miranda decision, an accused must be 
advised of certain specific constitutional rights, including the 
right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. 
Custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a suspect has been taken into 
custody and otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
Utah law has refined Miranda even further. In Holman v. 
Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a driver, suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, is 
at that point involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given 
the Miranda warning. The ruling in Holman was reaffirmed in Smith 
v. Cox, Utah, 609 P.2d 1332 (1980). There, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the defendant had the constitutional right not to give 
evidence against himself and must be given Miranda warnings if his 
statements are to be admitted in a criminal proceeding against him. 
In this instant case, the prosecution contended that the 
questioning was of the general inquiry type and appellant was not 
in custody or under arrest. Therefore, Miranda warnings were not 
necessary. This contention is contrary to the facts. The appellant 
was in custody and under arrest (T.122 and T.123). (See, also, 
Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168 (1983), Justice 
Durham concurring in result.) 
Miranda, however, can be understood more dearly by inter-
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preting an earlier United States Supreme Court decision. In 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 845 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 
977 (1964), the court held that a defendant is entitled to the 
assistance of counsel when the interrogation begins to focus on a 
particular suspect and that no statement elicited by the police 
during the interrogation may be used against him in a criminal 
trial. 
From the very nature of the offense, a suspected drunk 
driver comes within the protection of the principle developed in 
the Escobedo case as soon as he is stopped by the police officer. 
At the point of detention, the investigation is no longer a general 
inquiry into an unsolved crime, and has begun to focus on that 
particular suspect. 
Appellant strongly contends that she falls within the 
protections afforded by the aforementioned Utah and United States 
Supreme Court decisions. First, under Escobedo, the officer's 
detention and investigation was not for a general inquiry. The 
officer's interrogation was specifically focusing in on the appellant 
as a suspected drunk driver. Second, the officer did not give the 
requisite Miranda warnings to the appellant. Consequently, any 
oral statements made by the appellant during that time should not 
have been used against her at trial. 
Further, the appellant specifically requested and was 
refused permission to contact her attorney when the officer began 
the interrogation at the scene of arrest (T.65). It should be noted 
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that when a suspect requests an attorney, an officer is generally 
obliged to cease any interrogation immediately and within a reason-
able time provide the accused with an opportunity to contact an 
attorney. People v. Traubert, Colo., 608 P.2d 342 (1980). 
The prosecutor hinted that the appellant waiver her con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Such reasoning, 
however, is absurd. First, the burden was upon the prosecution to 
demonstrate that the appellant intentionally and voluntarily relin-
quished her constitutional right against self-incrimination. It 
was extremely difficult for the appellant to relinquish the rights 
she was never even informed of. Thus, it does not appear that the 
prosecution met its burden in proving that the appellant effectively 
waived her rights. 
Based on the foregoing, the appellant submits that several 
of her constitutional rights were violated. 
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, appellant's 
5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated. 
Further, appellant was denied her 6th Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Finally, appellant's right to due process 
and equal protection was violated. 
Therefore, appellant urges this court to rule the admission 
at trial of her oral statements as reversible error and to thereby 
reverse the conviction or grant a new trial. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
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BY ADMITTING RESULTS OF THE BREATH-
ALYZER TEST AT THE TIME OF THE TEST 
AS EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL 
IN THE BLOOD AT THE TIME OF DRIVING. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44(a) , provides that it is 
unlawful to drive while under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, 
for constitutional due process to be afforded the appellant, there 
must be some evidence of the amount of alcohol at the time of 
driving to determine if the appellant was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time of driving. 
There was no such evidence produced at trial (T.79, T.80, 
T.81, T.87, and T.88). 
The only evidence was the amount of alcohol at the time 
of the breath test (T.79 and T.80). 
Therefore, the appellantfs objection to the admission of 
all exhibits, motions to suppress, dismiss, mistrial, etc., all of 
which related to the amount of alcohol at the time of the breath 
test rather than at the time of driving should not have been over-
ruled or denied (T.9, T.135, T.136, T.137, and T.138). 
The trial court's rulings denied the appellant due process 
and equal protection of the law. Judgment should be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
BY GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
RELATING TO THE PRESUMPTIONS OF BEING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
The trial court instructed the jury: 
... in prosecutions for the 
offense of driving a motor vehicle 
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while under the influence of an 
intoxicating liquor, the amount of 
alcohol in the defendant's blood, 
as shown by chemical analysis of 
the blood or breath, give rise to 
the following presumptions: 
... (c) If there was at 
the time of driving 0.08 
percent or more by weight 
of alcohol in the defendant's 
blood, it shall be presumed 
that the defendant was under 
the influence of an intox-
icating liquor. 
These presumptions may be rebutted. 
By that I mean that these presumptions 
may be overcome by other competent 
evidence. In other words, it does 
not limit the right of the prosecution 
of (sic) the defense to introduce any 
other competent evidence bearing on 
the question as to whether or not the 
defendant was under the influence of 
an intoxicating liquor. 
The jury shall weigh all available 
evidence introduced to determine whether 
or not such presumption has been over-
come . 
In admitting evidence of a chemical 
analysis of blood or breath, the court 
does not determine the accuracy of the 
test. Such is a question of fact for 
the jury alone to determine. The pre-
sumption referred to arises only if the 
jury first determines that a reliable 
test is present. (T. 146 and T.147). 
The appellant excepted to this instruction for many 
reasons: 
1. No reliable test was given. 
2. The words "intoxicating liquor" were used rather 
than the word "alcohol," as prescribed in the 
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statute, and neither of which was defined. 
3. The words f,shall be presumed" made the 
presumption mandatory or conclusive, even 
though the court stated the presumption 
was rebuttable or permissive. 
We shall later in this brief discuss the distinction and 
more precise definitions of the various types of presumptions, e.g., 
Ifpremissive ,M "mandatory," or "conclusive." (Jeffries and Stephans, 
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 
Yale L.J. 1325 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 422 U.S. 510 (1979); 
State v. Robichaux, Utah, 639 P.2d 207 (1981); State v. Walton, 
Utah, 646 P.2d 689 (1982); and State v. Atkinson, Utah Third Judicial 
District Court, Summit County, No. 975, filed August 16, 1983). 
The common definition of the word "presumed" is to suppose 
that which is presumed is to be taken as being true without the 
necessity of proof. And the common definition of the word "shall" 
is that it is mandatory. (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 911 
(1974)). 
It is elementary law, without the need of supporting author-
ities, that every accused person is clothed with the presumption of 
innocence and cannot be found guilty without the state proving every 
single element beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt remains with the state throughout the entire trial. 
It never, never, never shifts to the accused. (Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
§76-1-501; State v. Walton, supra; State v. Robichaux, supra). And 
this provision of the law has reached constitutional dimensions 
-30-
through decisional law. (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1969)). 
In Winship, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Lest there remain any doubt about 
the constitutionality stature of the 
reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly 
hold that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged. 
(Id., at 364.) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Robichaux stated: 
... It is ... to be kept in mind 
that the burden of proving defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is 
always upon the state, both initially 
and ultimately. (State v. Curtis, 
Utah, 542 P. 2d 744 (1975) . See~7 also, 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 
1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). 
It is true that our courts have long recognized the pro-
priety of drawing reasonable inferences from proved facts and that 
there may be evidentiary presumptions applied. Nevertheless, evi-
dentiary presumptions do not relieve the state from its burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is for the trier of facts to determine. It is not for the court 
in its instruction to command as being proved because conclusively 
presumed. (Sandstrom v. Montana, supra). 
That is precisely what the instant instruction accomplished. 
The trial court commanded as being proved when it stated that it 
shall be presumed. The instruction did not become permissive by 
stating possible rebuttal. If standing alone without rebuttal, the 
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instruction was a conclusive presumption in violation of U.S. Const., 
Amend. XIV. And requirement for rebuttal would have had to come 
from the appellant, which would have been in violation of U.S. Const., 
Amend V, by shifting the burden of proof to her by compelling her 
to prove her innocence. 
Besides these federal constitutional requirements, Utah 
Const., Art. I, §12, provides that an accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence in his defense. To compel rebuttal to the pre-
sumption would be to compel the appellant to give evidence in her 
defense. 
Had the instant instruction stated that the jury may 
presume, the presumption would have been permissive and proper. 
However, when it stated the jury shall presume, it became conclusive 
and unconstitutional. 
Simply stated, permissive presumptions are proper. However, 
mandatory or conclusive presumptions are not proper. Permissive 
presumptions give the jurors the choice to determine the burden of 
proof. Whereas, mandatory or conclusive presumptions give the juror 
no choice to determine the burden of proof. 
In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, where the jurors were 
only told the law presumed a fact that the law presumes that a 
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, and 
were not told they had a choice or that they might not shall infer 
that conclusion, but, in effect, make their finding mandatory, the 
United States Supreme Court held: 
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Because the jury may have interpreted 
the challenged presumption as 
conclusive, like the presumptions in 
Morissette y. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, and United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 431 U.S. 422, or as shifting 
the burden of persuasion, like that in 
Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, and 
because either interpretation would have 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
requirement that the state prove every 
element of a criminal offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the instruction is 
unconstitutional. Pp. 514-527. 
(a) The effect of a presumption 
in a jury instruction is deter-
mined by the way in which a 
reasonable juror could have inter-
preted it, not by a state court's 
interpretation of its legal 
import. Pp. 514, 517. 
(b) Conclusive presumptions 
"conflict with the overriding 
presumption of innocence with 
which the law endows the accused 
and which extends to every element 
of the crime,M Morissette, supra 
at 275 and they "invadle the] fact 
finding function," United States 
Gypsum Co., supra at 446, which in 
a criminal case the law assigns 
to the jury. 
This court has very recently held that the use of a man-
datory rebuttable presumption in a jury instruction is uncon-
stitutional. (State v. Pacheco, Utah, P.2d (1985), 
citing State v. Chambers, Utah, P.2d (1985), Francis v. 
Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985), State v. Walton, supra, and 
Sandstrom v. Montana, supra). 
Conclusive presumptions are just plain unconstitutional and 
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may not be given in instructions to jurors. 
This was boldly and properly held by the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick while sitting in the Appellate Division of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, in 
State v. Atkinson, supra. 
From every approach, the instant presumption is conclusive 
and unconstitutional. The trial court erred by giving it. And 
the judgment of the lower courts must be reversed or the matter 
remanded for a new trial without it again being given to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial of this matter was fatally flawed by many fun-
damental errors, only a few of which are contained in this brief. 
Actually, the very first point is more than enough for reversal or 
remand. The other points also justify the same result. Still, 
other points were not included because of sheer time and space. 
Oral argument is hereby requested if the respondent does 
not confess error or if this court does not summarily rule as 
requested by the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this (^_\^- day of January, 
1986. 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the yfif~£r- day of January, 
1986, four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant were served on the 
Office of the Salt Lake City Attorney, 100 City & County Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, addressed to the attention of Roger 
F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Attorney, and Walter R. Miller. 
CC^J^r-V^c^i•• 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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FEB U f l i 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
municipal corporation, 
: CASE NO. CRA-83-1 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
SUSAN WOMACK, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PERTINENT FACTS 
On the 3th day of January, 1982 at approximately 10:00 
p.m., the appellant was observed by Officer James Pryor, Salt 
Lake City Police Dept., driving her car in a westerly direction 
on 900 South between State and Main Streets in Salt Lake City. 
The officer was one-fourth block behind the appellant when he 
ooserved the appellant going west on 900 South and into the 
storage lane to make a left-hand turn onto Main Street. 
After the appellant had entered the storage lane, she turned 
abruptly into the right-hand lane on 900 South and then turned 
right onto Main Street and proceeded in a northerly direction. 
The appellant was initially stopped and charged with the 
offense of making an improper right-hand turn from the storage 
lane. When the arresting officer approached the appellant's 
CITY \ WOMACK PAl-E TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
parked vehicle, the appellant r^1;* --r~ K < ^ v ^ ^ u - --^ *-u~ 
a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r d e t e c t e d .  -: . :i ~ a, c o hoi . 
Th e a. r r e s t :i i i g off -n 
d r i n k I n g T h e a p p e 1 la..' SdiJ .^ 11- . * : iai -.;,-:, i x , - ; i „ ^  K . 
The a p p e 1 1 an t re q u e s t ed a 1 a w y e r , b i 11 • • t he ar r e st i n g o f fi c e r 
r e f i i s e • :l 1 i € r r e 31 1 a s t 1 11: 1 1 :i ] s 1: 1 e 1 1 a • :::I j: =; 1: f 0 1: m e fil a f i a ] ::i s • :> i:: • i: i = t y 
t e s t . E o ur f i e1d s o b r i e t y t e s t s w e r e p e rf or m e d , A p p e 1 l a n t 
failed t :) follow i n s t r u c t i o n s , and f u r t h e r m o r e fai 1 ed to p e r f o r m 
s a 11 s f a c 101: i ] ;; < I" I: 1 e a r r a s t i ng :> f f i :: a 1: 11: :t a 1 1 t ::) 1 ! :i 1:1 1 a a 1: •;: • = 1 1 a n t 
s h e was b e i ng a r r e s t e d f 0 r Dr i v i ng Wh i 1 e Under t h e 1 n.f 1 u e n c e 
of A l c o h o l . 
Th-' ^ ' [ " '<' 1 "> i»i J "i f 1 < k-", 1 1 ., , 1 ,-ike 
C o u n t y J a i l . She a g a i n a s k e d f o r a l a w y e r , a s s h e ha J a s k e d 
f o r a l a w y e r a t t h e l o c a t i o n of a r r e s t ^t WfiS S o u t h Main S t r e e t , 
S a 1 t L a k e C i ty ,. 1 31 a 1 1. I I e 1 : r e • 31 1 e s t v, <E 3 • ::1 • a 1: 1 i • =!>• ::l S 1 1 a , » • a s ill:: :) 1 d 
c f t h e I m p I i e d C 0 n s e n t L a w , a n d w a s g I v e n a b r e a t h a 1 y 2 e r t e s t 
by Officer Dana Orgil 3 who had beer 1 trai ned and cert if i ed to 
a • i IT: 11 11 s t • = 1 : s 1 1 ::: i: 1 a t e s t r 1: 1 € • r a s i 1J t • :: f 11: 1 e t 1: e a 11 1 a 1 > 2 e r t e s t 
was .16 'I. T h e a p p e l l a n t w a s f o u nd g u i 1 1 y b y a j u r y • o f b e i ng 
I n a c t u a 1 p h y s i c a 1 c 0 n t r o 1 o f a n:i o t o 1: / e h I c 1 e w h i 1 e 1 11 1 • :I: a r t h e 
1 n f 1 1 1 e r 1 • ::  = • • D f a 1 :: • : • 1: 1 : • 1 :i 1 i : 1 a 1 : :i • : • 1: 1 : f S • = i :: t i : 1 1 ] 0 5 I I e • :i s e :i 0 r • :i ii 1: 1 a 1: 1 c e s 
of Salt Lake C11y on December 6, 1 982 . 
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POINT I 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED 
BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
OF THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST .FOR LACK OF FOUNDATION 
FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
The appellant cites Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983) for this contention. However, Murray City (decided 
after appellant's arrest and conviction) acknowledges that Section 
41-6-44.3 is a codification of the findings necessary to establish 
a proper foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer evidence. 
The Supreme Court stated at 1320, that- Section 41-6-44.3: 
" [R]equires an affirmative finding by the 
trial court that 1) the calibration and 
testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer 
and the ampoules were performed in accord^aee 
with the standard^ established by tha* Commis-
sioner of P U D I I C Safety, 2) the affidavits 
were prepared in the regular course erf~ tue 
public officer's duties,, 3) 'that they were 
prepared contemporaneously with the act, 
condition or event, and 4) the x source of 
information from which made and the method 
and circumstances of ttxoir preparation were 
such as to—irftdTCate their 'trustworthi ness . f " 
The court in Murray City concludes by stating at 1321: 
"We hold that so long as there is compliance 
with mandates of the statute, namely, contem-
poraneous stanoards in the regular course 
of the officer's duties, and indications 
of trustworthiness, the affidavits regarding 
-flie maintenance of a breathalyzer machine 
are admissible under 41-6-44.3 as a valid 
statutory exception to the hearsay rule. 
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As su-:::. '.:ose affidavits establish a rebuttable 
.presumption that the breathal y z e r rar^rre 
w* -; f :r,-'»- : .-;n i rv:: correctly. ,f 
There i s i i o reqi 11rement in this statute that expert testimony 
be a f f orded r egard i r ig t: 1: 1 e accuracy • : • f t i:ea 11: 1 a ] } z e r r • = • '"11I ts 
t: 
C o n c e r n i ng t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a 1 i t y of such s t a t u t e s , the M u r r a y 
C i_ ty c c: • i 1 3 : t s a i • 3 a t j 3 1 7, 1: i: :i a t s 1: a t u t e s and o r d i n a n c e s i 
11
 [A] re endowed with a strong presumption 
of v a l i d i t y ; and that they should not be 
declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l if there is any 
rea s o n a b l e basis upon w h i c h t h e y c a n be 
fou n d to c o m e w i t h i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
frame work [sic], , , '" 
From the transcript, the requirements of statute .14-6-44 „ 1 
appear: tc !: la • e 1: eei i met 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S SECOND POINT OF CONTENTION 13 THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
1
 N^Tir".'! \i" "> ' I H I 'i MnFIi^J TO PUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF IriE BREATHALYZER TEST BASED ON A DENIAL ub I U K 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION. 
I i i ' i -l - i .i 111 | i "JI i • ; i I I i i 1 T M =» I i M I i i n 1 11 i ^ 
y e t to be d e c i d e d by the Utah S u p r e m e Dour' » Murray C ity iii 
s t a t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t U t a h DU1 s t a t u t e s 4 1-6-4 4 and 41-*- - 4 4 . 2 
• :i 11 ' i i f 111 II , I MM i; [nil ] I 111 i iu.i I | i I »'1 i 111 f I I inj I J w 
Toe Utah Supreme C u u L 1 in b l l i u t t v . Don as , b b , 1- , *. -I 15 9 
(Utah 1976} , where the impl ied consen t law was read contemporaneously 
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with the field tests, instead of before, stated that deliberating 
such a distinction clearly "elevated form over substance." 
In the present case, appellant's concern over the arresting 
officer's method of explaining the implied consent law fits 
in the category of elevating form over substance and is without 
merit. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S THIRD POINT OF CONTENTION IS THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED BY COMMANDING THE APPELLANT TO 
SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. 
The appellant cites Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1983) in support of this contention. However, a 
careful reading of that case indicates that the court in earner 
found that the requests by the police officer for a field sobriety 
test did not amount to compelling the defendant to give evidence 
against himself. 
Furthermore, 41-6-44.10(a) states: 
" [A]ny person operating a motor vehicle 
in this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests 
of his breath, blood, or urine...." 
From the available facts as set forth in the transcript, 
appellant was not compelled by the officer to perform a field 
test; the officer used interchangeably the terms "asked," "re-
quested," and "commanded," but stated the appellant "agreed" 
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i i i i i ,i ^ p e r -j J i | 
a motor vehicle, the appellant impliedly consented tt; TfJ:h tests. 
Appellant * 1 >^ cites Hansen v. Owens, 6 1 -» P , 2d 115 i L tah 
* - .1 I N 11 I i i n i ill i i ii c » i 
with handwriting samples ana was discussed in State v. McCumber
 f 
662 P.2d 353 (Utah ly80j as being carefully : : n f m e j t- its 
t:act,s. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERPEL BY 
\. fclf i I I I J ' - T i i A T , r F ' - i r r M ' I N I W I T H - I ; I " T N * r n r n * * :~ A 
WARNING. 
A p p e l l a n t r e l i e s h e a v i l y on H l imn v . Cox , 598 P.Jd 1331 
n i l ! j * ' p , rl ) L i U d i i » I I I i i i 11 i i i h in in i i i i i i S p e t t h - r | f 
: r i v i n n u n c e r f n e i n f l u e n c e i • a i r e s t ed , he i^ it 11..1I ,. i . i t 
i n v o l v e d P I i c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n - a- : m a s t be q i v e n t h e rn i r anda 
* i i" n J 11 | , , , { t\i\{,»I1 i,-» i i . i c M ' 11 i i t 11 M i I I I I  . 11 a ML LI ) a L J I j e t i j 1 1 1 a flu f , 
u n d e r S e c t i o n 4 1 - ^ - 4 4 . 1 0 , i s n o t ent i t l eu i i ne a d n t e >f an 
a t t o r n e y b e f o r e f i e l d t e s t s a r e s u b m i t t e d t o . 
A p p e ,. l a i i i . ri i i *.* i i « j s i )"LII i i. in \ , i - A , 111 I i i i i M ;i h 
1979) whLjh r e a f f i r m e d t h e n o t i o n t h a t when a s u s p e c t i s a t t e s t e d 
cne ^ i r a n ^ W a r ^ " * m i s t oe g i v e n . 
^ ^ -' 1 I a. ,i'i i " i i t a t. euu »!ii 11 i i 111 i 11111 A11" ! 11 J • 
" v i e s , i p p e l l a n * : - i s s e r t s t h a t Holman s t a n d s £UL t h e p r o p o s i t i o n 
chat. j.i. vjiic io m e r e l y s c s p e c t e d uf d r i v i n g u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e , 
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the Miranda Warning must be given. However, the court in both 
Holman and Smith specifically mentioned that a suspect must 
be arrested before the Miranda Warning needs be given. 
There is little doubt that at one point during the officer's 
investigation an arrest was made and that the arresting officer 
failed to give the Miranda Warning. Justice Howe in earner, 
supra, defined an arrest as including the following factors: 
(1) Site of interrogation; (2) Investigation focused on the 
accused; (3) Objective indicia of arrest; (4) Length and form 
of interrogation. Justice Howe went on to say that in applying 
these factors to a field sobriety test, that a field sobriety 
test did not constitute an arrest. Justice Howe noted that 
although the environment of a field sobriety test may be authori-
tative, it is by no means coercive. 
Assuming, arguendo, however, that because no Miranda Warning 
was given, and the results of the breathalyzer test were therefore 
inadmissable, there was still sufficient evidence to support 
the jury verdict. Appellant admitted to the officer that she 
had been drinking before an arrest was made; the officer smelled 
the odor of alcohol; he was of the opinion appellant was under 
the influence of alcohol; furthermore, before an arrest was 
made, appellant failed to follow instructions and failed to 
perform the four field sobriety tests satisfactorily. 
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Therefore, although the trial court may have eueiil by a I i: .itting 
the results o f the breathalyzer test, it d i d n o t, e r r b y a 11 o w i n g 
In Li ii I ! " i <;\-l field iubiw-1 tests or the appellant1 s 
admission of her jonsumption of alcohol. 
POINT V 
A H J L L L 'hi i N J P I i I H V M r TP I V r u n l H i^'ifj ^ If r i l T I 0 M A L, 1, Y PFFPD 
BY A D M I T T I N G RESULTS OF THE BREATH TEloY Ai HIL I IMC Of P i t l L ' J T 
A S E V I D E N C E 0 F T H £ A M 0 U N T OF ALCOHOL IN THE BLOOD AT THF TIME 
C E i: F .1 m 3' 3 
A p p e l l a n t s i m p l y d o e s n^t s u b s t a n t i a t e t h i s c L a i TI . T h e 
ini t t Hi c o n t a c t b e t w e e n O f f i c e r P r y o r , the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r , 
11 in I d [ [ I I J I ' i ! | ' i ' ' i 11 i I M in r i i ' l 11 in i , a n d t b i 
b r e a t h t e s t wao a d m i n i s t e r e d a t i > i 1 1 n o u n s i > , , J i [ i j j , w>. J . 
w i t h i n t- h ^ t wo h o u r p r D v i s i o n s o f S w o t i-oTi 4 1 - t - 4 4 . 5 ( 2 '• , U t a n 
C o d e i i i i r :i 1 9 5 3 a s a: ae i id e 3 , s a i :i e i i • 3 e i i • :: e • , a s j : r : p e r 1 } r e c e i ed . 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED BY 
A D MIrT ' I11N G P. E S [ 11 , T S ?) I: TI IE B R EI ! T I I T E S T WI T H C • I IT F 0I IN D ?, TI • II t I 0 F 
ACCURACY BECAUSE OF RADIO INTERFERENCE. 
Appellant did not preserve this point for appeal. Accordingly, 
t l v e i: 1 ii i iii i ) *'i' ' * d . 
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POINT VII 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY ERRED BY 
GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY RELATING TO THE PRESUMPTION OF 
BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL 
Appellant is correct that under Section 76-1-501, a defendant 
is presumed to be innocent until each element of a crime is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this was clearly 
articulated in the jury instructions (T142). Appellant overlooks 
the fact that with regard to a crime charged there can exist 
a presumption of fajs-t (Section 76-1-503). ,The statute states: 
"An evidentiary presumption established 
by this code or anv other penal statute 
ti.e., witness 41-6-44(3) and its .08% pre-
sumption] has the following consequences: 
1) wnen evidence of facts which support 
the presumption exist, the issue of the 
existence of the presumed fact must be submitted 
to the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates 
the presumed fact; 
2) In submitting the issue of the existence 
of a presumed fact to the jury, the court 
shall charge that while the presumed fact 
must on all evidence be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts 
giving rise to the presumption as evidence 
of the presumed fact." 
In connection with the notion of presumptions, Utah Rules 
of Evidence 14(a) (in effect prior to September 1, 1983) states 
that if the facts from which the presumption is derived have 
any probative value as evidence of the existence of a presumed 
fact, the presumption continues to exist and the burden of establish-
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ing the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party 
against whom,, the presumot ion operates., 
I + a p p e a r s 11 1 e i 1 11 1 a t i i c t • : r :i ] } a :i : e f i: e s i u: i: i, p t :i • : i i s i :: • : i: :i s t: i 1: i 1 1 i : • i :i a 1 , 
\ :t t" t they are encouraged by both rules and statutes, 
-^f^S a p p e ] I a n t rel ies h e a v i l y upon S a n d s t r o in. v . State of 
M o i 11 a i i •; i , 1 4 2 I I S 5 ] 0 (] 9 ) ' 9 ) i , 5 \ ]: • ]:: : r 1: i i 3 h e r :: < :» n t • > n t i c • i: :i 
Th I s c a s e i s ea s i 1 y d i s t i n g u i s h a b 1 e • : i: i i t s f a c t s , Sandstrom 
w a s a. h o ra, i c i d e c a s e a n d t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n w a s a. c o n c 1 u s o r y 
c r Ie wi t ! i r e g a r • :I t : • t i Ie el eniet i t • :>£ :i i :it:„ei: I t : 1 1 I e ,:i i i s t r i i ::t:„i : i :t :: 1 i a 1 1 e n g e :I 
i n S a n d s t r o m e f f e c t i v e l y e l i m i n a t e d i n t e n t as a r i e l e m e n t o £ 
t h e o f f e n s e . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e p r e s u m p t i on i s not as 
t :: : • i: l • :• • : • f 1 1 I • 3 e 1 e i a e i 11 s : f t it l • s • :: r i rin,, e :: i: i a, r :j e :i 1: • i 1.1 i s • :: • :: r ::i. i :i, • 5 • :: t:„ e • :i 
w : ~ ^  one of the fac13 in.voI.ved .. 
A p p e 11 ant a 1 s o r e 1 i e s on S tate / . Robichaux , 6 3 9 P 2d .207 
(Utah 1981) . 11 I 11 i a t:„ c a s e t:„!: i e t r i,„ a 1 c o u r t a g a. I, n p r e s u n i j: • t i,„ ? e ] y 
i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury as to the intent of the defendant to take 
unauthorized m o n i e s . The quest i„ on, here , howe ver , is not whether 
the d e f e n d a n t i,„ n t e n d e d t D h a v e g r ea te r ti I<= „ i :i 08 i a 1 :: : 1: ic .,] :i i i 
h e r b o d y . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n e x a ra. i n i n 3 t h e c o u r t :i n s t r u c t i o n s 
i n. t:„. h e i n s t a n t c a. s e
 if t h e c o u. r t d ,i„ d n, :> t, i n s t r u c t t he j ur y t o 
1,
' ' c o 1 1 c 1 u s i \ e 1 i ' ' p r e s! 11 1 1 e a, r 1 > : f 11 1 =; e L e 1 n e 1: 11 s D f 11: 1 e • :: 1: ,:i 1 n. € :::! 1 a 1: • g e • ::i, 
( * i 2 . , T 14 2 . T14 4 , T14 5 , T14 6 ) T h =u i n struct i o n s i n t„.h i s c a s e 
were f a.r d i t i e r e n t tha,n th0se give 1: 1 ,:i 1 1, Sandstrom and Rob Ix ha ux . 
Cf- State v. Walton, 6 16 I '.2 i 689 (I J1 a t ] 982) . 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the lower 
court's rulings were in error. Therefore, the Judgment and 
Verdict are affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Circuit 
Court for imposition of sentence. 
Dated this February, 1985. 
DONALD L. GEORGE, 
Attorney for Plaint :i f f , 
451 South 2nd East, 
Salt Lake C it y, U t ah 84111 
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ORDER DEN YIN G DE F EN DkNT 
APPELLANTS MOTION TO' DISMIS 
CASE AND VACATE DECISION, 
AND REAFFIRMATION (AFTER 
REHEARING) OF MEMORANDUM 
DECISION DISMISSING 
DEFENDANT1 S AP^EAI . 
C a s e N D C :\ A Z : -• . 
B a s e d u p o n the r e c o r d of p r o c e e d i n g s , the b r i eis a nd m e m o s 
s u b m i t t e d ra . r i 11 i :n e a t 1 l e <• i r < I I T I S H E R E B Y 0 R D E R E D ! 1 > 
D E F E N D A N T - A P P E A L L A N I" ' S M 0 110 N 1 0 D I S M I 3 S C A S E A N D V A G A T E D E C I S I O N 
( d a t e d N o v e m b e r 3 0 , I 9 84) i s h e r e b y d e n i e d , a a d t h I s c o u r t s rne m o -
r a n d u a d e c i s i o n ( d a t e d F e h r u a r y 8 , 1 9 8 5 ) d e a y i a g t: I: i • = • I e f e n d a a t s 
a p p e a I by a f f i r m i n g t h e j u d g m e n t a n d v e r d i c t: o f t h e C I r c u i t C o i i r t 
a n d r e m a n d i n g t h e c a s e t h e r e t o f o r i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e , is h e r e b y 
r e a f f i r m e d . A s p e r t h e r e q u e s t » t H ii f t M I 11
 111 i1 . M I I I - r i'- n i, i i o f t: h e 
c a s e a n d f i l e i s t o b e d e l a y e d f o r t h 11 t; d a v s :roi?. t h e d a t e t h I s 
order is signed that the record may be held secure for possible 
forwarding to the Utah Supreme Court on further appeal by the 
Def endan t . 
DATED this Un day o fA^&£ 1985 
ATTEST 
H.D^ONHINDLEY 
l/V Clark 
Deputy Cterk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed/ 
delivered to Phil L. Hansen, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 
at S00 Bos Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on this 
>»slll985. a a v o 
h,, J-l 
-Yc. ijA 
